Turing: Concept of Computation :: Computers Computational Systems Papers

Turing Concept of ComputationTurings analysis of the concept of computation is indisputably the foundation of computationalism, which is, in turn, the foundation of cognitive science. What is gainsay is whether computationalism is explanatorily bankrupt. For Turing, all information processing systems are digital computers and something becomes a (digital) computer just in deterrent example its behavior is interpreted as implementing, executing, or satisfying some (mathematical) function f. As computer names a nonnatural kind, al near everyone agrees that a computational interpretation of this sort is necessary for something to be a computer. But because everything in the universe satisfies at least one (mathematical) function, it is the sufficiency of such interpretations that is the problem. If, as anticomputationalists are fond of pointing out, computationalists are wedded to the view that a computational interpretation is sufficient for something to be a computer, then everythin g becomes a digital computer. This not only renders computer-talk vacuous, it strips computationalism of any empirical or explanatory import. My aim is to defend computationalism against charges that it is explanatorily bankrupt. I reexamine several(prenominal) fundamental questions about computers. One effect of this computation-related soul-searching will be a framework within which Is the brain a computer? will be meaningful. Another effect will be a fracture in the supposed link between computationalism and symbolic-digital processing. If the standard by which to measure the explanatory revalue of a view were its revolutionary character, then Turings (1936) analysis of the concept of computation would be highly valued indeed. Whereas the science of mind was once dominated by behaviorists, today it is dominated by computationalists. For computationalists, the mind/brain is a computer. As computationalists came to shoulder the burden for explaining how the mind/brain works, Turi ngs analysis of what counts as a computer became the standard by which to justify empirical claims about whether something is a computer. According to Turing, all computers are digital computers and something becomes a (digital) computer just in case its behavior is interpreted as implementing, executing, or satisfying some (mathematical) function f. Because Turings analysis is considered the foundation of computationalism, which, in turn, is the foundation of cognitive science, there can be no doubt that Turings analysis has revolutionized the scientific study of the mind/brain. That much is not in dispute. What is, rather, is whether computationalism is explanatorily bankrupt.Although attacks against computationalism come in a variety of flavors, what bridles Searle (1990) and other anticomputationalists the most is the sufficiency of Turings analysis of what counts as a computer.